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Re-evaluating Recreational Easements- New Norms for the Twenty-First 
Century?  
By Susan Pascoe* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter evaluates the underpinnings for the validity of recreational and sporting 
easements in English law. Recognition of such easements represents a wider functional 
and progressive approach to easements, incorporating new norms of twenty-first-
century active lifestyles into what constitutes an easement. The chapter will seek first 
to analyse recreational easements by reference to Dyal-Chand’s sharing model of 
servitudes and to Alexander’s arguments on the promotion of human flourishing. 
Secondly, by reference to van der Walt’s analysis of the rationale and function of anti-
fragmentation strategies, it will be evaluated whether rights to use sporting and 
recreational facilities should be recognised as easements, and to what extent the 
proliferation of land burdens represents a shift away from the certainty and 
predictability of a numerus clausus of land rights. Thirdly, the complex dynamics of 
human and property relationships require a re-evaluation of the potential for greater 
conflict between dominant and servient landowners in maintaining the facilities for use 
of the easements, and necessitate a reappraisal of what constitutes possession and 
control of the servient land. Lastly, an assessment is made of the ex ante restrictions on 
easements versus their ex post regulation and the need for provisions for modification 
and discharge of easements. It is argued that sporting and recreational easements should 
be recognised as valid within the parameters analysed below. 
This evaluation is prompted by the decision in Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond 
Resorts (Europe) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Regency Villas),1 which raises some of 
these issues and acts as a useful starting point for this analysis. An appeal was heard in 
the Supreme Court on 4 and 5 July 2018. The Supreme Court’s decision was published 
too late for detailed examination in this chapter, but recognises the importance of 
recreation in modern life and has confirmed that there is room for development in 
English law, making the analysis of broader conceptual issues in this chapter, which of 
course apply across different jurisdictions, highly relevant. Prior to the decision, 
stability rather than innovation had been at the heart of the structural parameters which 
underlay the instrumentalist approach to recreational rights as easements. Regency 
Villas represents an extension to the scope of the decision in Re Ellenborough Park,2 
where rights to enjoy a park by landowners of surrounding properties were 
acknowledged to be valid easements. The reference to easements to play tennis and 
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bowls in Re Ellenborough Park3 was obiter and the case did not extend the rights 
generally to sporting and recreational easements.  
In the Supreme Court in Regency Villas, Lord Briggs (with whom Lady Hale, Lord 
Kerr, and Lord Sumption agreed, with Lord Carnwath dissenting) demonstrated twenty-
first-century vigour in acknowledging that ‘recreational and sporting activity … is so 
clearly a beneficial part of modern life that the common law should support structures 
which promote and encourage it, rather than treat it as devoid of practical utility or 
benefit’,4 and in recognising the necessary quality of utility and benefit to the dominant 
tenement for there to be easements over the Italianate gardens, two outdoor hard-
surfaced tennis courts, three indoor squash courts, a putting green, a croquet lawn, the 
new indoor swimming pool and the 18-hole golf course. The Supreme Court 
disapproved of the approach of the Court of Appeal in looking at the facilities grant as 
if it were a grant of separate rights to each facility. As Lord Briggs stated, ‘the Facilities 
Grant is in my view in substance the grant of a single comprehensive right to use a 
complex of facilities, and comprehends not only those constructed and in use at the time 
of the 1981 Transfer, but all those additional or replacement facilities thereafter 
constructed and put into operation within the Park as part of the leisure complex during 
the expected useful life of the Regency Villas timeshare development …’5 
Lord Briggs was clear ‘that the common law should, as far as possible, accommodate 
itself to new types of property ownership and new ways of enjoying the use of land’.6 
He was dismissive of past attitudes to ‘mere recreation or amusement’ as in the dictum 
of Baron Martin in Mounsey v Ismay,7 stating instead that ‘the advantages to be gained 
from recreational and sporting activities are now so universally regarded as being of 
real utility and benefit to human beings that the perjorative expression “mere right of 
recreation and amusement, possessing no quality of utility or benefit” has become a 
contradiction in terms.’8 Nevertheless, the decision in Regency Villas needs to be seen 
in the context of timeshare owners, where the servient estate was large and run as a 
commercial business open to the public as well as to timeshare owners – potentially 
over 150 timeshare owners who were able to act collectively through the Regency Villa 
Owners’ Club.  
In relation to indoor easements, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction which the 
Court of Appeal drew between outdoor and indoor recreational easements.9 The 
incorporation of value judgements about land use and recreation was particularly 
evident in the rejection by the Court of Appeal of recreational indoor games, activities 
and facilities on the servient land from the scope of easements. These value judgements 
about the utility and benefit to the dominant tenement were incorporated into the 
analysis in determining that the modern approach to taking physical exercise is not 
applicable to recreational indoor games, and this distinction was rightly rejected by the 
Supreme Court. It is unfortunate that disparate activities such as playing snooker, which 
is a sport, and watching television, a leisure activity, were grouped together without 
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differentiation by the Court of Appeal, for the ostensible reason that they were all to be 
carried on in the same area (the ground floor of the Mansion House) and on the basis 
of the reasoning that the right was really no more than a personal right to use chattels 
and services provided by the defendants. Watching television was rightly rejected for 
this reason as an easement, but the Court of Appeal was too hasty in rejecting a right to 
play snooker, because similar objections could be raised in relation to playing tennis or 
squash, and this was acknowledged by the Supreme Court. As Lord Briggs noted, the 
fact that the exercise of a claimed recreational easement involves the use of the servient 
owner’s chattels is not in itself a decisive objection: ‘it is no objection to the recognition 
of a right as an easement that it may be exercised over, or with the use of, chattels or 
fixtures on the land, rather than merely over the land itself.’10 Differentiation between 
playing snooker indoors and playing tennis outdoors might also lead to a result which 
is inconsistent with general norms against discrimination on the grounds of disability, 
such as seen, for example, in the Equality Act 2010. Because use of many of the 
facilities relevant to both indoor and outdoor recreation is not possible without the use 
of chattels, the approach of the Supreme Court is correct. 
The Supreme Court also acknowledged that ‘while it may be that a restaurant, viewed 
on its own, is not a recreational or sporting facility, it is perfectly capable of being 
viewed as part of a sporting or recreational complex.’11 The Supreme Court did not 
specifically make a decision in relation to the Court of Appeal’s rejection of a claimed 
easement to use the reception area and its back office, but Lord Briggs acknowledged 
that it was unlikely that communal parts of the ground floor and basement could have 
been intended to be excluded from the scope of the easements.12 The grouping together 
by location in the basement of the Mansion House of the gym, sunbed and sauna area, 
and the rejection by the Court of Appeal of claimed easements to use those facilities, 
was thus rightly overruled by the Supreme Court, which adopted instead a far more 
balanced and nuanced approach to the use of chattels, allowing the recognition of such 
easements.  
II. RECREATIONAL EASEMENTS, THE SHARING MODEL OF SERVITUDES 
AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
A. Sharing Model of Servitudes  
Easements always involve some degree of the sharing of land. However, the sharing 
model of servitudes advocated by Dyal-Chand13 appears to play no discernible role in 
the recognition of recreational easements in English law, because, as she acknowledges, 
exclusion – the conceptual opposite of sharing – is the thematic foundation of property 
law. Exclusion may be considered the defining characteristic of property ownership as 
a presumptive means of enhancing property’s role as a stable basis for market 
transactions. Sharing appears as the exception to the rule of exclusion. Her view is that 
it is somewhat ironic that courts recognise sharing by creating exceptions to rights 
rather than by more actively fashioning remedies to enforce sharing. In doing so, they 
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regularly fail to respond to the core problem of exclusion that they are drawn to 
redressing.14  
Using a vantage point provided by Oliver Wendell Holmes in the realm of contract law, 
Dyal-Chand develops a model for enhancing property outcomes and, in particular, for 
promoting sharing as a preferred outcome in core doctrinal areas, such as those 
involving claims of nuisance, adverse possession, implied easements and trespass.15 
She develops the ‘interest-outcome approach’ to better resolve core property disputes 
based on a model that provides both a modern and specific template for enriching 
outcomes in property law, since property sharing can be a very modern means of 
addressing distributional concerns such as those featured in Regency Villas. When a 
property law system is focused on outcomes in any given dispute, it is more likely to 
recognise opportunities to share. Shared uses are not just a matter of most effectively 
internalising the externalities of property ownership and use; they also can increase the 
‘size of the pie’, providing more individuals with access to property for the purpose of 
productive use.16 This approach also recognises the importance of use and possession 
over (and, at times, in lieu of) formal title, because use and possession are often 
legitimate interests that can serve as the basis for finding more equitable outcomes. 
Implied easements are a pertinent example of courts creating shared interests in land by 
granting limited rights of access and use to non-owners. 
It is true that focusing on legitimate interests, or justified expectations, will muddy 
crystalline rules that prioritise formal title and exclusion,17 and a focus on outcomes and 
reliance interests also could add ‘mud’.18 Indeed, Dyal-Chand acknowledges that there 
are certain challenges to the model, the most significant of these probably being that 
the model would create uncertainty and unpredictability of property rights and that this 
would cause market instability.19 Nevertheless, the most important feature of sharing 
under the interest-outcome approach is that it results in outcomes that represent 
compromises of some sort between the parties’ varying interests and require the 
tangible sharing of land as exhibited in Regency Villas. The use of tennis courts, 
swimming pools and golf courses may be an extension of the meaning of ‘utility and 
benefit’,20 but recognition of the benefits of physical activity in upholding the validity 
of recreational easements demonstrates elements of the sharing model, enabling 
incorporation of analysis of broader interests relevant in a dispute. For Dyal-Chand, 
sharing is a remedial option, but the sharing model is already implicit in some well-
recognised easements and the decision in Regency Villas demonstrates its osmotic 
incorporation into the corpus of the definition of easements. 
B. Sharing Servitudes and Human Flourishing  
It is illuminating to compare Dyal-Chand’s analysis with Alexander’s examination of 
governance property.21 Alexander rarely undertakes specific analysis of sharing, but his 
                                                 
14 ibid 652. 
15 ibid 654. 
16 ibid 668. 
17 CM Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577. 
18 Dyal-Chand (n 13 above) 679. 
19 ibid 681. 
20 J Bray, ‘More than just a walk in the park: a new view on recreational easements’ [2017] Conv 418, 
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discussion of governance property,22 defined as multiple-ownership property that 
requires governance norms to regulate the internal relations between the multiple 
owners,23 overlaps significantly with what Dyal-Chand describes as sharing remedies. 
In van der Walt’s view, it could be said that all sharing remedies, in Dyal-Chand’s 
terminology, create such governance property.24 Governance property aims at 
achieving certain values, including autonomy, aggregate welfare and the Aristotelian 
idea of human flourishing. Human flourishing is a pluralistic moral value comprising 
multiple values, including individual autonomy and freedom, social welfare, 
community and sharing, and personhood and self-realisation.25 
Easements are a governance property arrangement because of the proprietary interests 
of the dominant and servient owners who have conflicting interests, which require 
mechanisms to co-ordinate and maximise the values of their respective interests.26 
Recreational easements encourage and enable the flourishing of the owners of the 
dominant tenement, but inevitably inhibit the servient owners by restricting the use of 
their own land, even if the original servient owners entered into the consensual 
arrangements freely. The rivalrous nature of property is particularly highlighted by 
recreational easements and balancing the interests of the owners of the dominant and 
servient tenements, for example in relation to the allocation of responsibility between 
them to maintain the facilities, may accordingly be too complex an issue for governance 
property. 
Information theorists would argue for the optimal level of standardisation or the optimal 
level of systemic complexity for recreational easements.27 By way of contrast, 
progressive theorists are attentive to a wide array of factors and concerned that property 
should not employ simplifying rules that are insufficiently attentive to the values at 
stake. Adopting a progressive theorist’s approach to recreational easements, it is 
necessary for property to reflect democracy, promote freedom and advance human 
flourishing with the focus on ends rather than function. Progressive theorists 
affirmatively value ongoing considerations of whether property rules are serving the 
proper values and creating appropriate relationships.28 These regulate how property 
works as a social ordering device. The result in Regency Villas is consistent with a 
progressive property approach to easements to avoid a result which is unjust to the 
timeshare owners.  
By way of contrast to English law and the approach in Re Ellenborough Park,29 
American courts and legislatures have been very responsive to the demands for 
                                                 
22 For a critique of Alexander’s definition of governance property, see S Blandy, S Bright and S Nield, 
‘The Dynamics of Enduring Property Relationships in Land’ (2018) 81 MLR 85, 94–95. 
23 Alexander (n 21 above) 1856. 
24 AJ van der Walt, ‘Sharing Servitudes’ (2015) 4 European Property Law Journal 162, fn 1. 
25 Alexander (n 21 above) 1875. See further R Walsh, ‘Property, Human Flourishing and St Thomas 
Aquinas: Assessing a Contemporary Revival’ (2018) 31 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
197. 
26 Alexander (n 21 above) 1862–63. Legal mechanisms could, for example, facilitate increased use of 
landlords’ and tenants’ associations. 
27 See TW Merrill and HE Smith, ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1. See also JB Baron, ‘The Contested Commitments 
of Property’ (2010) 61 Hastings Law Journal 917, 920, 940, 950. 
28 Baron ibid 965. 
29 Re Ellenborough Park (n 2 above).  
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increasing the availability of servitudes since the time of the Industrial Revolution. By 
creating exceptions, adopting new categories and changing the content of doctrines 
received from English law, the courts freed American law from the most severe 
constraints imposed by classical servitudes doctrine in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.30 The Restatement (Third) of Property Servitudes (2000) adopted 
the principle that landowners may freely create servitudes unless they are illegal or 
unconstitutional or violate public policy, and instead shifted the focus to rules of 
interpretation and doctrines governing modification and termination of servitudes.31  
The desire for servitudes far outstripped those that could be supplied within traditional 
limits, and American courts and legislatures responded with pragmatic changes and 
exceptions that left only vestigial traces of traditional principles.32 They were able to 
do so, because American law provided easy access to land title records and provided 
nearly complete protection against servitudes to purchasers without notice. If the Law 
Commission reforms are introduced to overhaul implied easements, so that easements 
are implied only where they are necessary for the reasonable use of the land,33 
recreational easements would have to arise by express grant and be registered, so a 
similar approach to recreational easements could arguably be adopted in English law. 
This would not, however, deal with concerns over a proliferation of easements 
sterilising the use of the servient land. Since the American approach allows for more 
flexible discharge or variation of servitudes, English law would need to extend its 
means of ex post control of easements, as discussed in section V.B below.  
C. Indoor Recreational Activities 
The law of easements has not drawn a general distinction between outdoor and indoor 
easements, and easements which make use of indoor parts of the servient land have 
been recognised as valid.34 If a legal system were simply to exclude recreational indoor 
games, activities and facilities on the servient land from the scope of easements,35 this 
would constitute a rejection of a sharing-oriented outcome approach and of a 
progressive property approach, instead incorporating an exclusionary, ownership-
focused model to indoor activities. An interest-outcome approach would instead take 
full account of both parties’ actual use (or non-use) of the property, in its physical, 
social and economic context and with due regard for its effect on the community and 
society at large, and would possibly enable some kind of physical or temporal sharing 
of the property.36 Exclusion from the category of easements in relation to indoor 
activities should not be decided on the basis of what van der Walt terms an on/off 
switch. An on/off switch only allows the binary option between two opposite outcomes, 
                                                 
30 S French, ‘The American Restatement of Servitude Law: Reforming Doctrine by Shifting from Ex 
Ante to Ex Post Controls on the Risks Posed by Servitudes’ in S van Erp and B Akkermans (eds), 
Towards a unified system of land burdens (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 109. 
31 ibid 112. 
32 ibid 111. French gives examples of enforceable servitudes for condominium regimes, scenic 
highways, conservation of agricultural land and wildlife habitat and historic preservation: ibid 109. 
33 Law Commission, Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre (Law Com No 
327, 2011) [3.45] and clause 20 of Law of Property Bill. 
34 See, for example, Wright v Macadam [1949] 2 KB 744, Miller v Emcer Products Ltd [1956] Ch 304, 
Heywood v Mallalieu (1883) 25 Ch D 357. 
35 The approach preferred by the Court of Appeal in Regency Villas (n 1 above) [85] (Vos LJ), but 
rejected by the Supreme Court [90] (Lord Briggs). 
36 Van der Walt (n 24 above) 166. 
7 
 
whereas outdoor easements demonstrate a glider-switch approach,37 which enables a 
range of options in between the two extremes.  
Use of a gym as an easement requires individual analysis due to the benefits of physical 
activity and exercise. With the ever-increasing popularity of gyms, which encapsulate 
a modern approach to exercise, an easement over a gym would be a natural progression 
of a modern approach to easements. British Columbia is a common law jurisdiction and 
easements over a pool, gym and sauna were ruled valid in Strata Plan NW 1942 v Strata 
Plan NW 2050.38 More recently, in Strata Plan NWS 3457 v Strata Plan LMS 1425,39 a 
recreational facilities easement was accepted as valid with the recreational facilities 
including a community building with a sauna, whirlpool, kitchen, exercise room, 
amenity room, changing room and meeting room. The easement had been registered at 
the Land Title Office when the lands were developed in the early 1990s and the dispute 
was over responsibility to pay for the upkeep of the easement.  
The potential for human flourishing and the ‘community’ or ‘social’ interest in land 
would be acknowledged in taking a broad approach to indoor activities and would not 
result in the prioritisation of the individualism of private ownership. According to the 
social obligation norm,40 property is subject to social obligations and community-driven 
obligations, and private ownership entails obligations to act or refrain from acting for 
the purpose of promoting the collective good of the community.41 Models of sharing 
and human flourishing are nullified if all indoor recreational facilities are rejected as 
easements and it is therefore commendable that the Supreme Court in Regency Villas 
did not take that path. Questions over the interpretation and application of the test of 
utility and benefit, amidst an unarticulated apprehension of opening the floodgates to 
indoor easements, highlight some of the incongruencies and conflicts with interpersonal 
relationships which could arise, and which will be examined in section IV.  
III. ANTI-FRAGMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CERTAINTY AND 
PREDICTABILITY OF NUMERUS CLAUSUS 
The purpose of anti-fragmentation strategies or controls is to prevent an undesirable 
proliferation of real rights in land.42 The strategic, systemic application of anti-
fragmentation controls might have resulted in a refusal to recognise any of the 
easements in Regency Villas. Van der Walt examines the normative framework within 
which the control strategies are applied and developed and analyses two justifications 
for anti-fragmentation controls, which are the anti-feudalism narrative and the efficient 
land-use narrative.43 The latter narrative explains anti-fragmentation strategies with 
reference to their promotion of efficient land use or economic efficiency, which focuses 
on utility.  
                                                 
37 ibid 176–77 and see also Dyal-Chand (n 13 above) 664–66 who also uses the switch terminology.  
38 Strata Plan NW 1942 v Strata Plan NW 2050 (2008) 69 RPR (4th) 67 (BCSC).  
39 Strata Plan NWS 3457 v Strata Plan LMS 1425 2017 BCSC 1346, [2017] BCWLD 5382.  
40 GS Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745, 757. 
41 An example in English law can be seen in Empty Dwelling Management Orders established under 
the Housing Act 2004. See S Pascoe, ‘The Social Obligation Norm and the Erosion of Land 
Ownership?’ [2012] Conv 484, 487–91. 
42 AJ van der Walt, ‘The Continued Relevance of Servitudes’ (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3. 
43 ibid 4–5. 
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A. Relevance of Anti-feudalism Narrative and Numerus Clausus to Recreational 
Easements? 
As van der Walt has argued, the anti-fragmentation restrictions that characterise modern 
property law are, for civil lawyers, specifically anti-feudal guarantors of liberty and 
autonomy, bulwarks against a slide back into feudalism and oppression.44 The anti-
feudalism narrative describes the abolition of feudalism as a move away from a 
proliferation of fragmented land rights towards unified and absolute ownership. The 
problematic remnants of feudalism in English law re-emerge from time to time,45 but 
are not an explicit rationale for constructing boundaries for the validity of easements 
and are at best an implicit force only. In relation to profits à prendre, the Law 
Commission has recognised how they were originally created to facilitate a system of 
feudal landholding.46 Medieval law did not have much experience of easements apart 
from rights of way and rights to water, and profits were much more common and 
important.47  
Post-feudal civil law property doctrine, which, according to the anti-feudalism 
narrative, was aimed at ensuring that ownership remains a unitary, unfragmented right, 
finds its clearest expression in the numerus clausus, or closed catalogue, of nominate 
real rights in land.48 Based on the assumed value of a unitary and absolute right of 
ownership, the idea of a numerus clausus of property rights was to promote legal 
certainty, predictability and transparency as central values of the post-revolutionary 
scheme of rights. Anti-fragmentation controls such as numerus clausus ensured that the 
limited use-rights that the private owner is allowed to create do not contribute to a 
renewed erosion or fragmentation of ownership.49  
In relation to French and Belgian law, Sagaert argues that the restrictive function of the 
numerus clausus is especially relevant because, in the civil law, servitudes are ‘the 
modern translation of feudal burdens’.50 Van Erp argues that the strict civil law numerus 
clausus doctrine should develop towards a numerus quasi-clausus, because some 
flexibility is needed to regulate new forms of rights in property.51 He argues that what 
civil law could learn here from common law is flexibility, which enables property law 
to be more responsive to economic developments. What the common law could learn 
from civil law is that closing legal categories creates more legal security and reduces 
information costs. The question remains what the starting point should be: common law 
                                                 
44 ibid 7. 
45 See, for example, I Williams, ‘The Certainty of Term Requirement in Leases: Nothing Lasts Forever’ 
[2015] CLJ 592, 606–09 in relation to abolition of the escheat of freehold land and the feudal 
underpinnings of the certainty requirement for leases. 
46 Law Commission, Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre (Law Com CP No 186, 2008) [6.1].  
47 See AWB Simpson, A History of Land Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986) 107–
08. 
48 Van der Walt (n 42 above) 9. 
49 ibid 11. 
50 V Sagaert, ‘Party Autonomy in French and Belgian Law: The Interconnection between Substantive 
Property Law and Private International Law’ in R Westrik and J van der Weide (eds), Party Autonomy 
in International Law (Munich, European Law Publishers, 2011) 119, 127 discussed in van der Walt (n 
42 above) 9. 
51 S van Erp, ‘Numerus Quasi-Clausus of Property Rights as a Constitutive Element of a Future 
European Property Law?’ (2003) 7.2 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, available at 
https://www.ejcl.org/72/art72-2.PDF 11-2. See also B Akkermans, The Principle of Numerus Clausus 
in European Property Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2008) 118.  
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pragmatism or civil law theory? In van Erp’s view, neither should be the starting point, 
but rather historical-comparative analysis, taking into account socio-economic factors, 
should lead the way towards the most workable approach. 
Information theorists focus on numerus clausus in order to avoid the tremendous 
information costs that would be imposed if parties were free to create any kind of 
property rights they might desire,52 whereas progressive theorists do not take direct 
issue with the numerus clausus principle, but the values which they wish to further 
cannot necessarily be vindicated in the ‘standardized, stripped down form’ which 
information theorists value.53 Chang and Smith argue that in between the strict numerus 
clausus principle and the restriction-free numerus apertus principle, a compromise is 
to allow property customs, such as complex divisions of property rights or idiosyncratic 
customs, to create new, de jure property forms, where they impose tolerable 
information costs and prevent numerus clausus from becoming a straitjacket on 
property.54 Such an approach arguably enables recreational easements to adapt to the 
twenty-first century.  
De Waal argues for an approach that is similar to that adopted in English law, which is 
an approach that is flexible enough to allow a landowner to do something that was 
patently not possible in Roman law and that is directly in conflict with the anti-
fragmentation impulse of a strict numerus clausus: a landowner who has built and 
established a hotel business on her land could, in terms of the flexible approach, contract 
with a neighbouring landowner for the right of her hotel guests to stroll and picnic along 
the shore of a dam on the neighbouring land, and also to register that right as a praedial 
servitude55 in favour of the dominant property.56 Rural servitudes could not be acquired 
in Roman law purely for the right to stroll on another’s land, whereas a different 
approach was taken to urban servitudes.   
In English law, as McFarlane has stated, the significance of numerus clausus is how the 
courts police the most important boundary in land law between personal rights, on one 
side of the line, and estates and interests in land, on the other, a boundary on which the 
whole map of property law depends.57 In common law, the goal of legal certainty and 
stability is promoted through the requirements for a valid easement under Re 
Ellenborough Park.58 Although ownership is routinely fragmented, Regency Villas 
highlights an enduring tension at the heart of easement law between, on one hand, 
freedom to create property rights, which is an embodiment of individual autonomy and 
economic liberty, and on the other hand, preservation of the unity and absoluteness of 
                                                 
52 Merrill and Smith (n 27 above) 1. 
53 Baron (n 27 above) 920, 922. 
54 Y Chang and HE Smith, ‘The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of 
New Property Forms’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 2275, 2279, 2292–93. 
55 The term praedial servitude derives from Roman law and is used in civil law systems to describe a 
right which is granted over servient land for the benefit of dominant land. For the distinction between 
praedial and personal servitudes, see AJ van der Walt, The Law of Servitudes (Claremont, Juta, 2016) 
chs 5 and 6. 
56 MJ de Waal, Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitude in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (1990) 1 
Stellenbosch Law Review 1 discussed in van der Walt (n 42 above) 19–20. See also the South African 
decision in Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400.  
57 B McFarlane, ‘Keppell v Bailey (1834); Hill v Tupper (1863) The Numerus Clausus and the 
Common Law’ in N Gravells (ed), Landmark Cases in Land Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 1, 3. 
See also K Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ [1991] CLJ 252, 302. 
58 Re Ellenborough Park (n 2 above). 
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ownership, which is an embodiment of legal certainty and security of title. This tension 
still shapes the doctrinal debate about precisely where the line should be drawn in 
deciding on the permitted scope of easements.  
B. Relevance of the Efficient Land-use Narrative to Recreational Easements? 
The efficient land-use narrative is more suited to the analysis of recreational easements 
and focuses more directly on the utilitarian goal of ensuring or promoting efficient land 
use. As van der Walt recognises, the efficient land-use argument is sometimes used to 
argue for the abolition of restrictions, and sometimes for a qualified and flexible 
adaptation of some of the restrictive devices.59 The efficient land-use argument usually 
holds that restrictive strategies serve a legitimate function in modern law, but when 
circumstances change, overly strict adherence to the restrictive measures and 
inflexibility have a negative effect on the efficient use of land. On the basis of changed 
circumstances, they therefore usually argue, in one form or another, for a flexible 
approach that would retain the beneficial features of the anti-fragmentation strategies 
while allowing for some deviation where necessary.60 Recognition of the validity of 
outdoor recreational easements represents elements of this approach, suggesting that 
new categories of easements can be created even though they may appear to conflict 
with traditional restrictions.  
A consequence of the recognition of outdoor recreational easements is that a 
proliferation of land burdens can create an anticommons, which potentially results in 
underuse of a valuable resource, so that restrictive strategies like numerus clausus are 
justified in so far as they counter the anticommons effect of the proliferation of land 
burdens. A tragedy of the anticommons occurs when too many parties have the right to 
exclude and nobody has an effective use privilege with the result that the property is 
underused.61 This is potentially foreseeable with recreational easements, where the 
neighbouring owners may be seeking to avoid concurrent use of the land. Economic 
efficiency therefore justifies both retaining the traditional anti-fragmentation strategies 
and introducing new ex post strategies that would reinforce their efficiency in 
facilitating consolidation of fragmented land-use rights, such as the American 
mechanisms for discharging or varying easements.62  
The most significant feature of the efficient land-use narrative is that the normative 
framework within which it functions is unwaveringly utilitarian. Efficient land use, that 
is economic efficiency, optimisation of the conditions for free and wealth-maximising 
use of private property, is the only normative guideline. The real issue with recreational 
easements in Regency Villas might not be fragmentation of ownership, but 
commercialisation of land rights in the context of timeshare owners who wish to make 
full use of recreational easements granted to them. However, if an opportunity arose for 
                                                 
59 Van der Walt (n 42 above) 12–14. 
60 ibid discussing Sagaert (n 50 above) 123–24. See also B Rudden, ‘Economic Theory v Property Law: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem’ in J Eekelaar and J Bell (eds), Oxford essays in jurisprudence – Third 
series (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987) 237, 245. 
61 MA Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1163; MA Heller, 
‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 
Harvard Law Review 621 cited in van der Walt (n 42 above) 21. 
62 Van der Walt (n 42 above) 21. 
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the servient land to be used for other purposes, more efficient overall land use could be 
prevented by the holders of the recreational easements. 
IV. DYNAMICS OF HUMAN AND PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS AND 
CONFLICT BETWEEN DOMINANT AND SERVIENT LANDOWNERS 
There is the potential for conflict and friction between dominant and servient 
landowners, because easements limit the owner of the servient tenement in use and 
enjoyment of land for the sake of enhancing the use of the dominant tenement. This 
conflict can be exacerbated when conditions under which an easement is exercised 
change significantly over time as well as when there are changes in ownership. 
Principles of ‘give as well as take’63 are necessary to allow a co-existence of rights 
between landowners, reflected in formal or informal ground rules. Consequently, 
decisions as to validity of easements must not lay foundations for potential contention. 
Conflict could arise from the parties having to determine what would be reasonable 
charges that the servient owner could make for use of services or for the use of chattels, 
although use of the easement itself would be without payment of any charge or fee for 
the exercise of those rights.64 Another source of contention might be establishing what 
would be reasonable provisions made by the servient owner for regulation of the 
easements in the ordinary course, such as timings for use, obtaining access to the 
servient land, provision for use of chattels, tidying, cleaning, etc. A further potential 
source of tension may derive from the servient owner replacing facilities with those of 
the same or similar kind. Such factors may add to the problematic relationship between 
the parties depending on the circumstances. 
A. Conflict in Recreational Easements Between Landowners  
The issue arises whether potential conflict over the use of land should be a relevant 
factor in determining the validity of easements and its importance in ex post regulation. 
The analysis of Blandy, Bright and Nield of enduring property relationships in land has 
particular resonance in the context of recreational easements due to the need to avoid 
conflicts in sharing land in order to use the recreational easements. The dynamics 
approach acknowledges the broad range of legal, regulatory, social and commercial 
norms that touch on property relationships and recognises that those norms are not rigid, 
but evolve responsively to the spatial, temporal and lived dimensions of property in 
land.65 Such an approach recognises that property relationships are lived relationships 
that are sustained by their evolution over time to accommodate changing patterns and 
understandings of spatial use, new rights-holders, relationship needs, economic 
realities, opportunities and technical innovations,66 and so can be particularly pertinent 
to sporting and recreational easements.  
Under the dynamics approach, it is necessary to develop a more collective and co-
operative way of living to make the easement ‘work’.67 The schema draws attention to 
                                                 
63 R (on the application of Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland BC [2010] UKSC 11, [2010] 2 AC 70, [48] 
(Lord Walker) discussed in A Baker, ‘Recreational Privileges as Easements: Law and Policy’ [2012] 
Conv 37, 42–43. See also Purle J in Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2015] 
EWHC 3564, [48]. 
64 Regency Villas (n 1 above) Court of Appeal [86] and Supreme Court [32], [67]–[73]. 
65 Blandy et al (n 22 above) 85–86. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid 86. 
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variety and fluidity, and in particular draws out the relational, that is the contextual and 
‘between persons’ relations, recognising that these property relationships are in part 
socially constructed. The authors apply to property relationships the key idea from 
relational contract theory that parties to contracts are ‘embedded in complex 
relations’,68 which is particularly germane to recreational easements. The continuing 
nature of the relationship is an important feature, affecting the way in which the 
governing norms are articulated at the outset, and accommodating the possibility that 
these may need to evolve and be adjusted over time to reflect the dynamics of the 
relationship between right-holders.69 Woven within the idea of ‘enduring’ property 
relations, therefore, is recognition that as the relationship is sustained through time, 
there may be a degree of ‘give and take’ to accommodate changes in the use of land, in 
the identity of the rights-holders, in external regulatory and economic forces, as well as 
in the parties’ preferences for rigidity or flux. Where there is a dispute over shared 
space, it may be necessary to resolve not only the disputed property relationship, but 
also the personal relationship between the parties. If the personal relationship cannot be 
maintained, the property relationship may also falter.70 The need to police the 
easements may, however, militate against recognition of such easements.71 
Particularly important in the context of recreational easements is the parties’ unwritten 
understandings as to the use of the land which may be factored into the interpretation 
of the factual matrix. This is demonstrated well by the case of Bradley v Heslin,72 where 
the temporal nature of enduring property relationships meant that the formal legal 
easements no longer reflected how the land was laid out or the practices about usage 
that had developed over the 30 harmonious years before the relationship broke down 
between successors in title. The decision of Norris J, recognising an easement by 
estoppel to open and close gates, demonstrates how formal property rights changed over 
time and how the ‘real deal’ differed from the ‘paper deal’.73 The parties had evolved 
self-generated norms throughout the harmonious 30 years and such norms resulted in 
solutions moulded from ‘mud’ being transformed into ‘crystallised’ rights,74 acquiring 
proprietary effect. In the majority of lived relationships, the parties simply cannot afford 
the expense of litigation, so it is the muddy rights that endure in uncrystallised form. 
The consequence in relation to sporting and recreational easements is that courts should 
be amenable to recognising their validity, because the parties will develop their own 
norms to deal with practical difficulties that may arise over use of such facilities. 
B. Impact of Occupation or Possession on the Relationship? 
Van der Walt also acknowledges the more complex and contested image of human 
relationships,75 and how a progressive approach to easements may lead to conflicts 
                                                 
68 ibid 87, citing R Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions’ (2000) 94 
Northwestern University Law Review 877, 881. 
69 ibid 87–88. 
70 ibid 89. 
71 This is similar to the rule in contract that specific performance will not be granted if the relationship 
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v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1. 
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between landowners due to a shift in power between dominant and servient owners, 
with greater power for owners of dominant land.76 An easement will not be valid in 
English law if it requires the dominant owner to exercise a right to joint occupation or 
deprives the servient owner of proprietorship or legal possession.77 If the owner of the 
dominant land had to take actual occupation or possession of part of the servient land 
in order to give continued effect to the easement, that might point against the existence 
of such an easement in the first place. This test appears to be closest to the test of 
possession and control from Moncrieff v Jamieson78 where Lord Scott rejected the 
‘ouster’ principle that asks whether the servient owner is left with any reasonable use 
of his land and would instead ‘substitute for it a test which asks whether the servient 
owner retains possession and, subject to the reasonable exercise of the right in question, 
control of the servient land’.79 Some of the claimed easements in Regency Villas may 
have been so extensive as to leave the servient tenement without viable use. 
Such conflicts will be heightened even further if the servient owners were to go out of 
business and cease to maintain the facilities, and the owners of the dominant tenement 
would be at liberty to enter the servient tenement to maintain and repair the facilities at 
their own expense. There would need to be examination of the nature of the works that 
the dominant owner would undertake, since on one view that could prevent the right 
claimed being an easement if those activities became so extensive that they amounted 
to possession or occupation by the dominant owner.80 This would be a question of fact 
and degree in each case and would require an individual assessment of each right 
claimed and the level of maintenance that each relevant facility would require.81   
The potential impact on the human relationship between the parties of invasive 
interventions on the servient land must not be overlooked. If the dominant owners can 
provide their own water supply when they need to fill the swimming pool – if necessary 
from a tanker – and potentially provide even a filtration plant for the pool, and this 
would not be regarded as sharing possession of the land on which the pool is 
constructed,82 that would nevertheless be intrusive, and there would need to be an 
analysis of the logistics of organisation on the servient owner’s land. Equally intrusive 
would be if the dominant owners provide their own electricity to light squash courts 
with a generator or by other means if the owner of the servient tenement cannot be 
required to provide that electricity through a coin-operated meter system.83 Further, the 
dominant owners could mow the grass84 and take other necessary steps to make the golf 
course or croquet lawn playable, although if a golf course requires daily mowing to be 
properly playable, it was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal that might require 
                                                 
76 Van der Walt (n 55 above) ch 3. 
77 Regency Villas (n 1 above) Court of Appeal [60] (Vos LJ) deriving from Re Ellenborough Park (n 2 
above) 164 (Evershed MR) and see Supreme Court [61] (Lord Briggs). 
78 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42, [2007] 1 WLR 2620. 
79 ibid [59]. See also the discussion in Law Commission (n 33 above) [3.188]–[3.211]. 
80 Regency Villas (n 1 above) Court of Appeal [49]; but see the different view of Lord Briggs in the  
Supreme Court [64]–[65]. 
81 See also N Pratt, ‘A Proprietary Right to Recreate: Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts 
(Europe) Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 238’ [2017] Conv 312.  
82 Regency Villas (n 1 above) Court of Appeal [72] and compare the broad brush approach taken by the 
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83 ibid, Court of Appeal [68]. 
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taking ‘actual occupation or possession’, but the majority in the Supreme Court did not 
take such a view.85  
Due to the problematic effect on the relationship between the parties, rather than 
securing the right by way of an easement, if the law is reformed to enable positive 
covenants to bind successors in title, an alternative way this could be dealt with would 
be for a positive covenant on the servient owner to maintain the pool and the dominant 
owner to pay a fair share of the cost of this.86 Servient owners may rightly not wish to 
be constrained in the use of their own land in such a way, although that would not apply 
in the Regency Villas kind of situation, where the timeshare developer retains land 
specifically in order to provide the agreed rights and thereby obtains a much higher 
price for the timeshares. In other scenarios, this would, however, circumvent the 
limitation in the law of easements that no positive obligation could be imposed on the 
servient owner. This could impose undesirable clogs on title, except in the context of 
communal facilities where the sharing of running costs would minimise the burden on 
individuals.87 
C. Property Relationships in the Domestic Context – A Proportionality Test? 
There needs to be differentiation between, on the one hand, the situation where the 
servient estate is run as a commercial business providing sporting and recreational 
facilities and, on the other hand, the situation where the servient and dominant owners 
are domestic neighbours.88 Although there is not a distinct demarcation currently, as 
the law evolves, what may be an easement in a commercial context may not necessarily 
be an easement in the domestic context, although in both cases it will need to be 
established whether there is the required element of utility and benefit to the dominant 
land. Baker has suggested that rights between neighbours which would interfere with 
reasonable notions of domestic privacy should not be recognised as easements, and 
where recreational rights interfere with domestic privacy, even expressly conferred 
privileges should be regarded as merely personal arrangements.89 Indoor easements 
have, however, been recognised, such as an easement to use a toilet,90 and an easement 
to use a kitchen belonging to the owner of a neighbouring tenement for particular 
purposes was implicitly recognised as valid in Heywood v Mallalieu,91 although failed 
for other reasons. As Baker states, rights to share kitchen facilities are more important 
to commodious living than the use of a tennis court, so greater leeway can be expected 
with the former.92 In relation to the upmarket residential context, he argues that 
recreational facilities could perhaps be supported only where the facility was out of the 
way of the alleged servient house and covered only a small proportion of its grounds. 
Such an argument could be used to justify an easement allowing the use of indoor 
squash courts and tennis courts, and perhaps indoor and outdoor table-tennis tables.  
                                                 
85 Regency Villas (n 1 above) Court of Appeal [60] and see too Lord Carnwath in the Supreme Court 
[101]–[105], disagreeing with the approach of the majority at [64]–[65].  
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87 Baker ibid. 
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Van der Walt and van Staden suggest a proportionality test to be incorporated in 
balancing two prominent common law principles, namely, that the servitude holder has 
all the rights necessary for the effective exercise of his servitude, and that the servitude 
must be exercised civiliter modo, so as to impose the least possible burden on the 
servient land.93 The civiliter principle protects the interests of the servient proprietor by 
requiring that the servitude be exercised reasonably, in a manner that will cause the 
least damage or inconvenience to the servient property. In the balancing or 
proportionality analysis, the question is whether avoiding the harm that not awarding 
the servitude will cause for one party justifies the harm or loss that awarding it will 
cause for the other.94 Focus would be on actual use, use interests and the potential for 
sharing, and a contextual assessment of all competing or conflicting rights and interests 
is required. In the context of easements in English law, it would, however, be very 
cumbersome to introduce a proportionality test into the ex ante recognition of 
easements. 
A proportionality analysis can be contrasted with the strong undercurrents of exclusion 
in the domestic context. This was demonstrated by the obiter dictum concerning use of 
a swimming pool in Moncrieff v Jamieson95 where Lord Scott doubted whether the 
grant of a right to use a neighbour’s swimming pool could ever qualify as an easement, 
because the swimming pool owner would be under no obligation to keep the pool full 
of water and the grantee would be in no position to fill it if the grantor chose not to do 
so. Lord Scott’s concern in Moncrieff was the considerable and disproportionate 
imposition on the servient tenement that filling and using a swimming pool would 
require.96 English law may now be different from Scottish law on this point, since the 
right to use an outdoor pool in English law is capable of being an easement, and it would 
entitle, though not require, the dominant owner to fill the pool if the servient owner did 
not do so.97 Nevertheless, a right to swim or play golf may lie on the edge of what can 
be accepted as a servitude in Scottish law.98 
Although in van der Walt’s and van Staden’s analysis, proportionality includes 
constitutional goals, and there are no such defined constitutional goals in English law, 
a proportionality test could serve a useful function in the context of recreational 
easements, especially in the domestic context. It may be that the proportionality test 
would then be merely a different means of undertaking utilitarian calculus. In practice, 
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in nearly every case where a servient owner grants a dominant owner the rights to use 
sporting facilities, it is because the servient owner is in the business of providing sports 
facilities or is a charitable or public body whose purposes include the provision of 
sporting facilities. However, in the domestic context, access to indoor facilities may be 
far more problematic than access to outdoor facilities, and the impact of enduring 
property relationships in land and the significance of human relationships within them 
must not be overlooked in decisions relating to the validity of easements. 
V. EX ANTE RESTRICTIONS VERSUS EX POST REGULATION OF 
EASEMENTS 
Ex ante controls prevent or restrict the creation of easements from the outset, while ex 
post controls provide for the amendment or termination of already existing easements.99 
In English law, the common law mostly provides for ex ante controls as laid down in 
Re Ellenborough Park,100 while ex post controls would need to be created in or derived 
from statutory provisions,101 which would require legislation by way of a reformulated 
section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 to modify or terminate easements in English 
law. There is some limited ex post control at common law, because an easement will 
end if an irreversible change of circumstances means that the easement no longer 
benefits the dominant tenement.102    
A. Ex Ante Restrictive Controls 
Ex ante restrictive controls, in prioritising security and stability of land rights, are 
justified insofar as they limit the rights which can burden properties perpetually by 
controlling the freedom of landowners to create new land burdens that will bind 
successive owners, which might result in inefficient fragmentation. Questions of 
intergenerational fairness focus analysis on allowing current owners to impose burdens 
on future generations which may be irremovable.103 Stricter ex ante regulation of 
easements also minimises the dangers of idiosyncratic burdens on land. However, ex 
ante restrictions can be viewed as an infringement of the private autonomy of the parties 
to an easement and from a contractarian perspective, stability may arguably result from 
absolute private autonomy.104  
Crystal rules are exemplified by the traditional rules of easement law which regulate 
easements ex ante, determining beforehand the content of an easement and denying 
consideration of anything falling outside those boundaries.105 French has taken the 
extreme view in proposing that no restrictive ex ante rules should regulate the creation 
of servitudes, and all that should be required for the creation of a servitude is that there 
is a valid contract which is aimed at the creation of a servitude that complies with the 
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formal requirements for transactions involving land.106 Other authors have taken more 
nuanced approaches, such as Sagaert who asserts that the value of ex ante measures of 
regulation are found in the extent to which they ensure that burdens placed on land are 
objectively useful.107 However, he agrees that a better way to realise the goal of 
continued usefulness of burdens on land would be to enable the abolition of these rights 
when they become obsolete. Nevertheless, English law has confirmed the importance 
of ex ante restrictions in determining the validity of sporting or recreational easements 
and the need to determine the nature of the works and level of maintenance which the 
servient owners would be required to undertake for maintenance or repair.108  
B. Ex Post Regulation of Easements 
Van der Walt has argued that the traditional ex ante strategies of preventing 
fragmentation are becoming increasingly more unsuitable and ex post strategies of 
correction are more suitable to the dynamic economy of the twenty-first century.109 In 
his view, both common law and civil law jurisdictions are gradually shifting away from 
‘an ex ante (common-law rule) preventing the creation of “atypical property 
arrangements” to ex post (statutory and judicial intervention) remedying the negative 
effects of such arrangements’.110 The American Restatement (Third) of Property 
Servitudes provides a good example of a move to ex post controls.111 Flexibility is 
mostly linked to new, corrective ex post controls that can rectify the problems caused 
by inflexible application of the preventative ex ante controls, without abandoning them 
altogether. The most commonly used argument in support of flexibility is that the law 
should allow termination or amendment of ageing, obsolete and unworkable land 
burdens and should allow variation of existing land burdens for the sake of better 
planning. Permanent, inflexible land burdens create restraints on alienability and 
produce inefficiency in land markets.112 The counterarguments are that registration can 
overcome most problems caused by land burdens and that allowing ex post variation or 
termination could cause uncertainty.113  
The ex post regulation envisaged in Regency Villas was for the servient owners to make 
reasonable provisions for regulation of the easements in the ordinary course.114 
However, as already noted, if the grant does not provide agreed regulatory structures 
regarding, for example, timings and resolution of disputes, then any shared enjoyment 
must be exercised reasonably, which again is likely to be contested. Another manner of 
ex post regulation would be to impose time-limits on the existence of all easements. 
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Lovett and Rose115 support durational limitations on the protection of servitudes, and 
Lovett proposes a period of 30 years as appropriate for the initial protection stage.  
One of the factors that tends to make the law reluctant to add extra rights to the numerus 
clausus is the difficulty of removing a right once it has been attached to land as a burden, 
so the easing of that will have a knock-on effect on any judicial inclinations towards 
numerus clausus. Even though in practice, problematic easements may be removed by 
negotiation and payment of compensation, ex post corrective measures to amend or 
terminate easements to address flexibility problems should be introduced, as the Law 
Commission has recognised with its proposal that section 84 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 be amended and extended so as to apply to easements and profits.116 Its 
recommendation is that an easement should only be modified if the Lands Chamber of 
the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the modified interest will not be materially less 
convenient to the benefited owner and will be no more burdensome to the land 
affected,117 which will inevitably restrict the jurisdiction for modification. 
Nevertheless, such reforms are long overdue and will incorporate significant ex post 
regulation into English law, which will have consequential impact on ex ante 
restrictions and, accordingly, encourage flexibility. Conversely, if the ex ante controls 
are relaxed as Regency Villas suggests, this makes the case for expanding the ex post 
controls even more compelling.  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A new normative framework has emerged in the academic literature within which the 
validity of recreational and sporting easements should depend on a range of contextual 
factors, recognising that the categories of easements are in need of modernisation in 
order to be fitting for the twenty-first century. Policy considerations in recognising 
easements which encourage physical activity are a welcome development. The 
Supreme Court has removed a potential dichotomy between indoor and outdoor 
activities, so the negative externalities of indoor easements no longer represent a central 
paradox, and this development in the law has significant implications for the normative 
content of easements, conceivably removing a legal lacuna in cases with complex 
factual scenarios. 
This chapter has analysed different conceptual approaches through which recreational 
and sporting easements can be evaluated. Such evaluation will now be crucial in 
English law: following the Supreme Court’s innovation in Regency Villas, the courts 
will now need to determine the precise scope of recreational and sporting easements. 
Incorporating notions of sharing and human flourishing would encourage a progressive 
approach to easements, whilst balancing anti-fragmentation controls such as numerus 
clausus with the efficient land-use narrative may be a catalyst for flexibility within the 
law. Questions of how to manage the long-term relationship between dominant and 
servient owners will require co-operative arrangements and mechanisms for the usage 
of recreational easements. Although the decision in Regency Villas needs to be seen in 
                                                 
115 Van Staden (n 103) 176–77, citing CM Rose ‘Servitudes, Security and Assent: Some Comments on 
Professors French and Reichman’ (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403, 1414. 
116 Law Commission (n 33 above) [7.35], [7.49], [7.55], [8.52], [8.54], [8.56] and see Law of Property 
Bill, clauses 30–32 and Sch 2. Note that in Regency Villas (n 1 above) Lord Briggs at [79] referred to 
the Law Commission’s proposals. 
117 ibid [7.60], [8.57]. 
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the specific context of timeshare owners, a holistic approach to recreational easements 
means that there cannot necessarily be neat lines between commercial and non-
commercial contexts. The floodgates are unlikely to be opened in the domestic context 
where a narrow view of recreational easements is likely to prevail.  
The conceptual analysis undertaken in this chapter will provide a valuable framework 
for scrutinising the future development of recreational and sporting easements, not only 
in England, but also in other jurisdictions. Certainly, a nuanced application of the test 
of utility and benefit is needed to incorporate fairness and address distributional 
concerns and anxiety over intrusion on the servient land in recognition of the complex 
dynamics of human and property relationships. One lesson from the chapter, however, 
is that the common law rules form only one part of a more complex picture. For 
example, statutory intervention would be required for a significant shift in the 
regulation of easements from an ex ante approach, focusing on stability of land rights, 
to flexible, ex post regulation of easements. Such a shift would add value to land 
arrangements and enable the law to develop in a progressive but incremental way. 
 
